Abstract: This paper examines the impact of deposit insurance (DI) schemes on bilateral crossborder deposits. Our results suggest that not only the existence of explicit DI, but also DI design features, which reflect its credibility have an impact on cross-border deposits, and that the relative differences between reporting and depositor countries also matter. More importantly, in times of crises, depositors rely more on DI in general, but DI acts primarily as a "Safe Haven" rather than enabling "Regulatory Arbitrage". During the global financial crisis of 2008/09 the emergency actions of bank country governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, have led to substantial relocations of cross-border deposits.
Introduction
Until the 2008/09 financial crisis, cross-border depositing increased rapidly not only in the interbank market, but also in the retail market. After a short period of retrenchment during the crisis, crossborder depositing started growing again and by September 2014 rose to US$26 trillion, of which US$8 trillion constitute cross-border liabilities to non-banks.
1 Global deregulation, regional integration initiatives such as the introduction of the euro and the elimination of capital controls in many developing countries enabled banks to expand cross-border financial services rapidly. For customers, foreign deposit markets offer not only return opportunities and product diversity but foreign deposit insurance (DI) schemes also provide cross-border depositors with an opportunity for regulatory arbitrages and access to a safe haven, especially during financial crises. This paper provides an in-depth investigation of the relationship between cross-border retail depositing and national DI schemes in tranquil and crisis times. By evaluating the impact of the emergency actions taken during the 2008/09 global financial crisis, we also provide a unique analysis of the impact of crisis policies on cross-border banking.
The existence of a DI can make a banking market more attractive to cross-border depositors in two ways: First, depositor's funds are guaranteed by the DI agency. Second, a DI scheme may contribute to a more stable banking system by preventing bank runs as argued by Diamond & Dybvig (1983) . However, this effect is disputed as moral hazard can induce banks to engage in riskier activities thereby increasing the likelihood of a banking crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1997 , 2002 Rossi, 1999) . The empirical literature does not yet offer any unambiguous evidence on the relevance of DI for cross-border depositing. For example, Lane & Sarisoy (2000) examine the relationship between an explicit DI and several measures of private capital inflows to developing countries but find no significant link. However, their measures of capital inflows are mainly composed of funds that are not insured. 2 Huizinga & Nicodème (2006) focus more closely on international liabilities including deposits. 3 While they find that non-bank external liabilities increase after introduction of an explicit DI, they do not find any role for specific DI features. Similar to Lane & Sarisoy (2000) , their results are at least in part driven by the inclusion of uninsured liabilities.
Furthermore, due to the aggregate level of their data at the bank country level, they are only able to 1 As reported by the Bank of International Settlements' Locational Banking Statistics. 2 Lane & Sarisoy (2000) focus on developing countries in 1990s and analyse gross private capital flows, net private capital flows, international syndicated loans and international bond issues. 3 Huizinga & Nicodème (2006) focus on developed countries from 1983 to 1999 and analyse the impact of the existence of an explicit DI scheme on external liabilities. Their data differentiate interbank and non-bank liabilities and originate from the BIS's International Banking Statistics. Note however that (1) interbank liabilities are generally not insured and (2) non-bank liabilities include insured deposits but also a certain amount of uninsured funds.
investigate whether a DI system makes a given country more attractive to all foreign depositors in general.
By contrast, our paper employs a uniquely suitable data set of bilateral cross-border retail deposits provided confidentially by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). Our data are based on the BIS's Locational Banking Statistics and cover cross-border deposits between 168 depositor countries and 24 bank countries for the period from 1998 to 2011. We are -to the best of our knowledge -the first to use such a detailed dataset and are therefore able to contribute to the understanding of the role of DI schemes for cross-border depositing in numerous ways. First, our study extends the literature by analyzing retail deposits, e.g. deposits of households and nonfinancial corporations that are actually covered by DI schemes. As such, we can investigate the direct insurance effects and do not need to make any interference about the implications of DI systems on financial systems. Second, we investigate not only the attractiveness of the bank countries' DI, but also the importance of DI differences between the depositor's home country and the bank country.
Analyzing the role of bank countries' regulations builds on the existing literature and inquires whether DI provides a "Safe Haven". The analysis of DI differences across countries adds to the literature and is informative about "Regulatory Arbitrage". Third, we investigate not only the effect of an explicit DI but also consider its specific features. As argued by Eisenbeis & Kaufman (2015) the effectiveness of a DI depends crucially on its design and implementation. Despite deposit market internationalization, significant heterogeneity still exists across national DI schemes 4 potentially increasing the relative attractiveness of a deposit market. As our analyses will cover regulatory differences across countries we can provide in-depth insights into which features of a DI can induce regulatory arbitrage. 5 Fourth, we provide an analysis of the potentially changing importance of safe havens and regulatory arbitrage during stable versus crisis times using the Laeven & Valencia (2008 , 2010 financial crisis database. Here we build on who find that during systemic banking crises, depositors discipline their home banking system by relocating deposits to foreign safe havens. 6 Fifth and finally, we investigate the impact and efficiency of emergency actions taken by many countries in response to the severity of the 2008/09 crisis, which included explicit and often enhanced government guarantees over and above the regular DI coverage. We find that both, the quest for safe haven and regulatory arbitrage are important drivers of cross-border depositing in stable times. Conversely, in times of financial crisis, it is mainly the safe haven motive that dominates. This safe haven motive is particularly important during the financial crisis of 2008/09. We also provide evidence that the emergency actions taken in bank countries, in particular the introduction of government guarantees, are major drivers of global retail deposit relocations towards safe havens.
The plan of the paper is as follow. In section 2 we develop our gravity model for analyzing the impact of DI on cross-border deposits by formulating five hypotheses and the corresponding specifications of the gravity model. Section 3 details the various extensive databases we are using.
Section 4 reports the results. Section 5 concludes.
A Gravity Model of Cross-Border Deposits
We apply a gravity model framework to empirically analyze the impact of DI on bilateral crossborder deposits. Based on Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) , the gravity model has been proven successful in explaining international trade and, in its basic form, explains bilateral trade with the trading partners' economic masses and geographical distance (Krugman, 1980; Helpman & Krugman, 1985; Baltagi, Egger, & Pfaffermayr, 2003) . Later studies extend this basic model to capture additional bilateral characteristics more precisely, including joint trade agreements, common currency membership, or cultural distance (Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2006) . In line with Portes & Rey (2005) , who argue that gravity model could at least work as well in explaining asset trades as good trades, gravity modelling has more recently extended to the realm of international finance as well (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Martin & Rey, 2004; Buch, 2005; Portes & Rey, 2005; Aviat & Coeurdacier, 2007; Buch & Lipponer, 2007; Coeurdacier & Martin, 2009; Okawa & Van Wincoop, 2012; Kleimeier et al., 2013 Kleimeier et al., , 2014 . The bilateral character of the dependent variable makes the gravity approach the model of choice to analyze both, the safe haven behavior and, in particular, regulatory arbitrage behavior.
We start with the investigation of safe haven behavior and employ the following gravity model that tests the relationship between DI schemes in the bank countries and cross-border deposits:
where are the exchange rate adjusted stocks of cross-border deposits from depositors in country j to banks in country i in year t. refers to the economic masses of bank country i and depositor country j in year t, which equals to the sum of logarithmic GDP of the two countries.
represents other control variables commonly used in gravity models, including proxies for banking market size, de facto and de jure openness (e.g. bilateral trade and a globalization index), currency unions and free trade agreements. Following Baldwin & Taglioni (2006) and in accordance with Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, & Siegel (2013) we use a full set of country pair, bank country, depositor country and year fixed effects given by , , and , respectively. Our focus does not lie on the general determinants of international deposits. Thus, instead of adding controls for transactional frictions such as geographical and culture distance, legal origin and common language 7 , we employ country pair fixed effects to control for all these time-invariant variables that may affect crossborder deposits. Country pair fixed effect can control bilateral trade resistance which is the size of the barriers to trade between countries i and j. In addition, we follow James & Van Wincoop (2003) and include bank and depositor country fixed effects to control multilateral trade resistance, which refers to the barriers which each country i and j faces in their trade with all their trading partners (including domestic and internal trade). Finally, we employ year fixed effects to control for common time-varying factors. is our variable of interest and captures the different features of the bank country's DI scheme. In its simplest form, it represents a dummy variable equal to 1 when an explicit DI exists in the bank country i in year t but we also explicitly measure various design features of the DI scheme in the bank countries.
We postulate that depositors are attracted to a given bank country when its DI provides depositors with a safe haven. As banks transform deposits into risky loans and other risky assets, depositors are exposed to the bank's credit risk. However, depositors prefer to reduce or even eliminate their exposure to bank risk and thus value the protection provided by DI. However, only a well-designed DI scheme can provide depositors with effective risk reduction and avoid moral hazard problems (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983 , 1986 Merton & Thakor, 2015) . As such, specific features of the DI scheme such as coverage ratio, DI funding or power of the DI agency should matter to depositors. These considerations lead to our first hypothesis:
7 Regarding specific determinants of cross-border deposits, Grilli (1989) finds that non-bank deposits are driven by interest taxes and bank secrecy, while interbank deposits are determined by dividend taxes and economic size. Alworth & Andresen (1992) use a gravity model to explain cross-border deposits with reserve ratios. Huizinga & Nicodème (2004) find a weak linkage between bilateral bank liabilities held by non-banks and income taxes. Heuchemer, Kleimeier, & Sander (2009) find that cultural factors act as barriers to crossborder depositing in the Eurozone. As countries also have their own freedom to design their DI schemes, this provides room for international regulatory competition and thus for regulatory arbitrage by depositors. Specifically, the differences in DI schemes between bank and depositor countries may matter in a relative way, with the DI system in the depositor country serving as a benchmark. Thus, besides the absolute quality of a DI system in the bank country, depositors may also care about the relative quality of a DI system in the bank country, taking into account other variables such as physical and cultural proximity or the existence of joint trade agreements or a joint currency. This leads to our second hypothesis. Figure 1 provides a first impression of the evolvement of 9 A cross-border deposit occurs when a bank in one country receives a deposit from a depositor who resides in another country. Specifically, our definition is based on the residence and not the nationality of the bank and depositor. For instance, a cross-border deposit is made when a depositor who resides in country A deposits money at an institution (i.e. subsidiary or branch) of a bank that is located in country B, independent of where the head-quarter of the bank is located. In comparison, domestic deposits are made when residents of country B deposit money with a bank that is located in country B. Thus, we are exactly examining those cases where a depositor crosses a national border. 10 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Netherlands, Panama, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States. 11 Our full data set for cross-border deposit covers 1995-2011, however, the DI data set only start from 1998, and during the 2008/09 financial crisis, many emergency actions have been taken to enhance the DI schemes, both permanently and temporarily. respectively. We only expand the survey data forward so that cross-border deposits are regressed on pre-determined designs of DI systems.
H1: Safe Haven Hypothesis

H2: Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis
Our proxies for specific DI characteristics capture the insurance benefits for the depositor as well as the moral hazard problem introduced by a poorly designed DI scheme. As argued by Barth, Caprio, & Levine (2004) , the existence of a DI can induce banks to increase their risk taking and a moral hazard problem arises when risk levels become excessive. However, a DI scheme can be designed to limit moral hazard for example by introducing coinsurance or risk-based insurance fees.
We consider the existence of an explicit DI, the DI power and DI moral hazard mitigation as core features of a DI scheme and will thus focus on them in our empirical analyses. However, we will also report results for various individual DI features.
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Among the three core DI proxies, the existence of an explicit DI is our most fundamental measure. It is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if a bank country has an explicit DI in place and zero if no or only an implicit DI exists in the bank country. Next, we include Barth et al. (2004) DI power measure. This index considers whether the DI agency has the power to make the decision to intervene in a bank or takeover a troubled bank, has the power to take legal action against bank directors or officials, or has ever taken any legal action against bank directors or officers. The index ranges from zero to four, depending on whether the DI agency has none or all three of these powers.
A DI agency without these powers might be ineffective, i.e. in cases of political interference or weak relationships between DI agency and the bank supervisors, who instead of the DI agency have the power to resolve bank failures (Garcia, 1999) . Finally, we combine some of the individual DI proxies to generate a DI moral hazard mitigation index. Here we follow Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2002) and consider whether a DI scheme is funded by the government, the bank or both, whether the insurance fees charged to banks vary based on risk assessment, or has formal coinsurance. In each case, a value of one is assigned such that the DI moral hazard mitigation index can range from 0 to 3.
Higher values imply greater ability to mitigate moral hazard. This index is based on individual DI features which fall into four different categories.
Regarding the specific DI characteristics, we first consider several measures of the size of the DI coverage from the perspective of the depositor. The coverage ratio reflects the DI's coverage limit divided by the per capita GDP in the bank country. Limit per person is measured as a dummy variable equal to one if the DI scheme imposes insurance limit per depositor, and zero otherwise.
Coinsurance is a dummy variable equal to one if formal coinsurance by the depositor is part of the DI scheme, and zero otherwise. Under coinsurance, only a certain percentage of the value of a deposit is covered while the remainder is uninsured and can potentially be lost in case of bank failure.
Foreign currency coverage is a dummy variable equal to one if the DI scheme covers not only domestic but also foreign currency deposits, and zero otherwise. Additional compensation is a dummy equal to one if uninsured depositors were compensated from the DI guarantee fund the last time a bank failed. While a high degree of coverage is beneficial to depositors, it also increases moral hazard. As argued by Garcia (1999) , limited or restricted DI coverage reduces moral hazard as large, sophisticated depositors remain uninsured and thus have an incentive to monitor and discipline banks by demanding higher deposit rates or refusing to deposit funds altogether.
Second, we consider the extent of DI coverage from the perspective of the banking system as a whole. The uninsured ratio indicates the fraction of banks' large denominated debt liabilities relative to total assets that are definitely not covered by any explicit or implicit savings protection scheme. Insured funding measures the percent of the commercial banking system's assets that are funded with insured deposits.
Third, we utilize a DI's funding source index. This index is set to 1 if the DI scheme is funded by banks only, to 2 if it is jointly funded by banks and the government, and to 3 if it is funded by the government only. Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (2002) argue that moral hazard is stronger under government funding but weaker under bank funding as banks do not bear the cost of their moral hazard. Thus, an increasing value in the funding source index indicates stronger moral hazard.
Fourth, compulsory participation is a dummy equal to one if participation in the deposit insurance system is compulsory for banks, and zero otherwise. Compulsory participation is important to avoid adverse selection in particular when DI premia are not risk adjusted. In this case, the strongest banks have the most incentive to withdraw from the DI leaving only the weakest bank as DI members (Garcia, 1999) . Even without risk-based DI premia, compulsory participation eliminates this adverse selection problem and thus leads to a stronger DI scheme.
DI schemes change over time even before 2008 and vary across countries as the summary statistics in Table A2 To test the effects of crises on cross-border deposits, we employ the Systemic Banking Crises
Database by Laeven & Valencia (2008) which identifies three types of crises, namely banking, currency and sovereign debt crises. A banking crises is defined as a situation where "a country's corporate and financial sectors experience a large number of defaults and financial institutions and corporations face great difficulties repaying contracts on time. As a result, non-performing loans increase sharply and all or most of the aggregate banking system capital is exhausted". We consider all systemic banking crises during our sample period, that is, 1998-2007. Table A3 in the Appendix shows the frequency of banking crises over time and indicates that banking crises are more frequent in 1998-1999 which at least partly reflects the Asian crisis. During the following years, the number of systemic banking crises fluctuates on a relatively low level. As the Systemic Banking Crises Database also includes information on the starting and ending year of the systemic banking crises that enables us to cover not only the start of the crises, but also the whole period of it.
Finally, we include a set of control variables that are specific for the bank and borrower country pair and vary over time. is based on the total GDP of both countries obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators Database. From the IMF's International Financial
Statistics we obtain our proxy for credit, e.g. the size of the banking market measured as the two countries' aggregate domestic credit to the private sector as percent of GDP. We employ three measures of openness. First, the Index of Globalization serves as a proxy for de jure openness.
Second, we measure de facto openness via trade which reflects the imports and exports between the bank and depositor country and is obtained from the STAN Database. Third, we include a dummy variable set to one if both countries belong to the same free trade area (FTA). We also control for exchange rate risk by coding a dummy variable equal to one if the bank and depositor country belong to the same currency union. FTA and currency union data are obtained and updated from Sander et al. (2013) and Kleimeier et al. (2014) with the original definitions following Rose (2005) and Ilzetzki, Reinhart, & Rogoff (2008) , respectively.
Results
Safe Haven and Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross-Border Depositing
In this section we examine the impact of various DI designs on cross-border deposits. In addition, we assume that not only the design of the DI system in the bank country matters, but that also the differences in DI design between bank and depositor country matters. In other words, we investigate the Safe Haven and Regulatory Arbitrage hypotheses.
We start with the Safe Haven Hypothesis by investigating the impact of the existence of an explicit DI in the bank country, its moral hazard and power on cross-border deposits based on our gravity model of equation (1). Results are shown in Panel A of Table 1 . Regressions (1) to (3) provide a parsimonious specification in which we only control for size in addition to our various fixed effects.
The specification of regressions (4) to (6) is more profligate with a more complete set of control variables. As during our sample period, explicit DI does not change over time for any given bank country, we can only include depositor country and year fixed effects in regressions (1) and (4). In regression (1), the impact of an explicit DI is highly significant and -as expected -positive, indicating that bank countries with an explicit DI attract more cross-border deposits than bank countries without an explicit DI. Results regarding the DI agency's power and actions taken to mitigate moral hazard in the DI systems affect cross-border deposits are reported in regressions (2) and (3) and indicate that more deposits flow to countries whose DI agency have more power or take more actions to mitigate moral hazard. 13 Our results are not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. For example, the introduction of an explicit DI is associated with a 4.5 fold increase in cross-border deposits. As the shift from an implicit or non-existence to an explicit DI constitutes a fundamental change in the country's banking system, such a substantial increase in cross-border deposits is not surprising. Furthermore, a one unit increase in the DI power and moral hazard mitigation increases cross-border deposits by 6.2% and 5.1% respectively. In regressions (4) to (6) we add more control variables but our DI results remain significant. 14 Economically, the introduction of an explicit DI is now associated with a 3.5 fold increase in cross-border deposits, which is still substantial. 15 Overall, our results are in line with our Safe Haven Hypothesis: The existence of explicit DI systems and the strength of the overall features of the DI schemes attract more cross-border deposits to that country.
We now continue to examine, whether the specific DI design features also matter. Results are reported in Panel B of Table 1 . Regressions (1) to (5) and (10) to (14) focus on the different proxies of the DI coverage that are directly relevant to the depositor. Generally, depositors favor bank countries with DI schemes that provide a high level of insurance in terms of coverage ratio 16 but deposit less in countries with formal coinsurance. Interestingly, besides the current DI designs, historical records of the DI systems are also important. The positive and significant coefficient of additional compensation implies that a bank country will attract more deposits if during the last bank failure, uninsured depositors were compensated from the deposit guarantee fund. Regressions (6), (7), (15) and (16) analyze the role of DI coverage from the perspective of the banking system as a whole. More insured funding is associated with more cross-border deposits, while the impact of the uninsured ratio is insignificant. So far, the results in Panel B indicate that depositors care about DI 13 Similar to Huizinga & Nicodème (2006) , we also lag the DI variables to allow for the possibility that DI schemes may only affect cross-border deposits with a lag, because depositors may need time to relocate their deposits concerning a DI change. Results are shown in Table A4 of the Appendix and are robust. 14 GDP coefficients are often not or only marginally significant because of the use of the full set of dummies.
The other control variables generally show the expected coefficients indicating that cross-border deposits are higher when bank and depositor country are linked by trade flows, are member of the same FTA or share a common currency. 15 It is important to note that the number of observations varies across regressions (1) to (3) and (4) to (6), respectively, due to the fact that bank countries do not necessarily participate in all three DI surveys and that even in the same survey, some countries may only answer part of the survey questions, resulting in various missing values in different DI measures. 16 The coefficient in regression (10) just misses the 10% significance level.
coverage of their own deposits, as well as the DI coverage of the banking system as a whole. The remaining regressions in Panel B focus on the potential DI-induced moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the bank country by including the funding source index and compulsory participation proxies, respectively. Only the former is significant in regression (8) indicating that depositors tentatively favor countries in which banks' moral hazard is limited as funding is mainly provided by banks. Although some of the specific DI features are insignificant in some regression specifications, the overall results support our Safe Haven Hypothesis: In addition to the existence of explicit DI, DI design features also affect the international location of non-bank deposits. Even if some specific DI features are not directly relevant, they matter in aggregate as depositors favor countries with a DI that induces less bank moral hazard as measured by our aggregate DI moral hazard mitigation proxy.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
So far we only examine how the DI systems in the bank countries would impact cross-border deposits. However, the differences in DI schemes between any pair of a bank country and a depositor country may also matter in a relative way. In this sense, the DI system in the depositor country may serves as a benchmark. Next to the absolute quality of the DI system in the bank country, depositors also care how much better the DI in the bank country is relative to their home country. To test for the Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis, we take differences of all the DI measures between all pairs of bank countries and depositor countries and regress cross-border deposits on these differences in DI schemes as indicated by model (2). Results are shown in Table 2 . From Panel A we can conclude that depositors hold more funds in bank countries with better DI schemes than they can find in their home country. Specifically, depositors from countries without explicit DI tend to deposit their money in bank countries with explicit DI while depositors from countries with explicit DI are less likely to deposit their money in bank countries without explicit DI. Equally relevant in terms of statistical significance is the result that bank countries whose DI authorities have relatively stronger power than the DI authorities in the depositor countries attract more crossborder deposits. In contrast, the coefficients for moral hazard mitigation actions are insignificant.
While results are overall in accordance with the Regulatory Arbitrage Hypothesis, it also becomes clear that regulatory arbitrage relies to a large extent on the relative power of the DI agency. 17 Panel B shows the impact of country-pair differences in DI design features on cross-border deposits.
However, only differences regarding additional compensation and DI's funding source are significant in both regressions with only size as control and with the full set of controls. Limit per person and insured funding are significant only in one of the regressions. In combination, the results from Panels A and B indicate that regulatory arbitrage only occurs when the bank country's DI surpasses a minimum level of trustworthiness as indicated by the role of DI power and regulatory arbitrage is in general less important for depositors.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Cross-Border Banking and Home Country Banking Crisis
In this section we investigate whether the relationships between DI schemes and cross-border deposits would change when bank countries experience a systemic banking crisis. Depositor country banking crises are modeled as indicated in equations (3) and (4) and reported in Table 3 and Table 4 .
In Table 3 we examine Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis. As shown in regressions (1) and (4), the existence of an explicit DI is important for foreign depositors both in stable times and in times of crises. This indicates that when the depositor's home country is undergoing a systemic banking crisis, depositors still trust the foreign DI systems. Furthermore, the power of the DI agency and the actions taken to mitigate DI-induced moral are found to be more important during times of crises.
Economically regressions (5) and (6) indicate that one unit stronger DI power and DI moral hazard mitigation is associated with 8.3% and 11.6% more cross-border deposits during crisis times compared to only 6.2% and 7.3% during stable times, respectively. These results support our Safe
Haven in Crisis Hypothesis and indicate that depositors value safe havens more when their home countries are undergoing a systemic banking crisis.
When it comes to specific DI design features in bank countries during stable and crisis times,
Panel B of Table 3 shows several remarkable findings. Firstly, the coverage ratio as a measure for the degree of depositor protection in the bank country, is only important when depositors experience a crisis at home. Secondly, the existence of formal coinsurance only matters during stable times, maybe due to the fact that under most DI schemes the depositors' self-burden is low, typically ranging from 10% to 25%. During crises, depositors care more about whether their covered portion of deposits can be claimed or not, rather than about the relatively smaller self-burden portion.
average depositor can relocate funds quickly in response to changes in the DI scheme. However, the lower significance may also be due to the fact that our filling methodology already ensured that the DI variables are pre-determined and thus already include an implicit lag. [Insert Table 3 about here]
Using model (4) to test our Regulatory Arbitrage in Crisis Hypothesis, Table 4 reports the results during stable and crisis times for the differences in DI between bank and depositor countries.
Panel A reveals that depositors are more willing to chase "better" explicit DI in stable times. Even more distinctly, DI power only matters during stable times. This result stands in contrast to the results for Safe Haven in Crisis Hypothesis in Table 3 where effects become stronger rather than weaker during a crisis. One possible explanation could be that depositors consider regulatory arbitrage during stable times, but when they are hit by a crisis, they care less about the arbitrage opportunities and only care whether their deposits are relatively safe, that is, whether their deposits are deposited in countries with better explicit and more powerful DI. Panel B investigates the role of specific DI design features. Again, regulatory arbitrage turns out to be not relevant during crises.
Overall, Table 4 therefore suggests that regulatory arbitrage behavior decreases or even disappears in times of crises and depositors only move across borders when they are not protected by an explicit or powerful DI scheme at home.
The evidence provided here indicates that safe havens are becoming more important during crisis times while regulatory arbitrage only remains relevant for depositors from countries without an explicit DI. On might say, that depositors search for the best protection in time of crisis and thus relocate deposits to safe havens. Only during stable times are depositors willing to consider regulatory arbitrage.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The Role of Emergency Actions during Global Financial Crisis
Our analysis so far suggests that during a banking crisis in the home country, safe havens become important to depositors. However, during the 2008/09 financial crisis safe havens were in short supply as bank countries which for most of the time of our analysis had not experienced a banking crisis are now subject to a crisis as well. As a consequence, many bank countries took emergency actions by implementing explicit DI schemes or enhancing government guarantees. To examine the impact of such emergency actions on cross-border deposits, we employ a difference in difference analysis as outlined in model (5) and thereby test our Emergency Actions Hypothesis. Results are shown in Table 5 . It is important to note that we do not only rely on the full sample of country-pairs involving all bank countries, but also conduct the difference in difference analysis with a subsample containing only those country-pairs for which the bank countries have experienced the 2008/09 crisis. By doing this, we can further narrow down our control groups, thus making our results more precise, i.e. countries that have undergone the 2008/09 crisis have similar characteristics and this similarity is higher within this subgroup than compared to countries that were not exposed to the 2008/09 crisis. We start with regression (1) where we examine the impact of an explicit DI introduction and show that this emergency measure significantly increases cross-border deposits.
Similarly regressions (2) to (4) show that cross-border deposits increase when government guarantees, whether limited or unlimited, are introduced. Regressions (1) to (4) (8) to (14). This shorter period mitigate the time trend concern in the sense that the early years of the sample period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) could be -for reasons unrelated to the crisis -substantially different than the more recent years and confirms our previous results. In sum, the emergency actions appear to be very successful in terms of providing the safe havens that depositors were looking for during a global financial crisis.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Conclusions
Our results indicate that the existence of an explicit DI, as well as other DI design features, affect cross-border depositing and thus the geography of global banking. The existence of an explicit DI is attractive to foreign depositors in the sense that it provides a higher level of deposit safety. But the design of the DI plays an important role, too. Eisenbeis & Kaufman (2015) argue that an effective DI system consist of a credible guarantee, effective monitoring by supervisors, and an efficient resolution mechanism. Our results show that the DI power and moral hazard mitigation proxies which encompass credibility and effective monitoring matter also for cross-border depositing. Our findings regarding specific DI design features further underline the importance of credibility as depositors identify safe havens as those banking markets with DI schemes that provide high coverage, additional compensation and low coinsurance. We further demonstrate that the relationships between DI systems and cross-border deposits vary in stable times and in times of systemic banking crisis in depositor countries. In crises times depositors have more incentives to chase a safe haven rather than to engage in regulatory arbitrage. When it comes to a global finance crisis it is the emergency actions of bank country governments, which supply and maintain these safe havens, that matter and can lead substantial relocations of cross-border deposits. As such, these actions do not only rescue the banks and domestic depositors of the countries taking these (credible) emergency actions. They also have measurable and sizeable effects on other countries in a financially interdependent world, which may call for coordinated emergency actions which take possible spillovers across countries into account. However, even in tranquil times, our results show that the design of an effective DI must take the DI's impact on cross-border activities of depositors into account. Our findings add therefore also to the debate on the design of macroprudential instruments in globalized financial markets. This discussion, currently focused on bank lending, questions their effectiveness when banks and borrowers are able to circumvent these measures via regulatory arbitrage and calls for coordination among national regulators (Houston, Lin & Ma, 2012; Ongena, Popov & Udell, 2013; Reinhardt & Sowerbutts, 2015) . Likewise, our findings, documenting a novel pattern of save haven and regulatory arbitrage driven behavior by depositors, stresses the need for a coordinated regulatory strategy with respect to deposit insurance schemes. from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from customer country j to reporting country i in year t. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Panel A: Main features of the deposit insurance scheme (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from customer country j to reporting country i in year t. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. (4) and (8)- (11) are based on a full sample of country-pairs including all 22 bank countries, while regressions (5)- (7) and (12)- (14) are based on a subsample of country-pairs including only those bank countries that have experienced the 2008/9 crisis. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are in the first row, the t-values are below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Currency union Dummy equal to 1 ifbank and depositor country belong to the same currency union 1/0 Ilzetzki et al. (2008) ; data available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/ilzetzki/IRRBa ck.htm Note: With the exception of size, trade, credit, currency union, FTA, stable, crisis and 2008/09 Crisis Period, proxies are originally measured on a country-and year-level. For the Safe Haven analyses, the proxies for the bank country are used, e.g. Proxy it . For the Regulatory Arbitrage analyses, the difference between the bank and depositor country is used, e.g. Proxy i jt = Proxy it -Proxy jt .
IMF: Systemic Banking Crises Database (Laeven and Valencia, 2008 , 2010 Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from customer country j to reporting country i in year t. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) Note: This table presents the estimates from ordinary least square regressions of cross-border deposits from customer country j to reporting country i in year t. All variable definitions can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. The coefficients are reported in the top row, t-values are reported below in brackets. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
